


Let Z and Q be propositional operators standing for ‘it will come to pass that’ and ‘it might and might not come to pass that’, respectively. Let S be a description of a future state of affairs.


The three possible states of the future (‘will’, ‘will not’, and ‘might and might not’) have a *contrary* relationship that can be illustrated as follows:



As contraries that exhaust the field of future states, one must be true and the other two false $[(S) [(Z(S) \vee Z(\sim S) \vee Q(S))]$. From this we derive three theorems:


- I. $Z(S) \leftrightarrow \sim Z(\sim S) \wedge \sim Q(S)$
- II. $Z(\sim S) \leftrightarrow \sim Z(S) \wedge \sim Q(S)$
- III. $Q(S) \leftrightarrow \sim Z(S) \wedge \sim Z(\sim S)$

The contradictory of each of these three possible future states $[\sim Z(S), \sim Z(\sim S), \sim Q(S)]$ have a *subcontrary* relationship with each other that can be illustrated as follows:




Since $Q(S)$ entails both $\sim Z(S)$ and $\sim Z(\sim S)$ (by Theorem III), it is clear $\sim Z(S)$ and $\sim Z(\sim S)$ are conjointly true when $Q(S)$ is true. It is equally clear that $\sim Z(S)$ and $\sim Z(\sim S)$ cannot be conjointly false. At the same time, $Z(S)$ and $Z(\sim S)$ cannot be conjointly true (by Theorems I and II) while $\sim Z(S)$ and $\sim Z(\sim S)$ cannot be conjointly false. The same results obtain *mutatis mutandis* for the other pairs, $\sim Z(S)$ and $\sim Q(S)$; $\sim Z(\sim S)$ and $\sim Q(S)$. Hence, for each pair, it is possible that both be true and not possible that both be false, which is why it is necessary to identify their relationship as subcontrary.

We should further note that each of the six poles expressing the three possible future states and their contradictories have *subaltern* relations with each other that can be illustrated as follows:



If $Z(S)$ is true, the subaltern $\sim Z(\sim S)$ is necessarily true. The same applies to the relationship between $Z(S)$ and the adjacent $\sim Q(S)$. Likewise, if $Z(\sim S)$ is true, the subaltern $\sim Z(S)$ is also true while the same subaltern relationship exists between $Z(\sim S)$ and $\sim Q(S)$. Lastly, $Q(S)$ has subaltern relations with the adjacent propositions such that if $Q(S)$ is true, both subalterns $\sim Z(\sim S)$ and $\sim Z(S)$ are true.

Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that the Hexagon is comprised by three versions of the Aristotelian Square of Opposition, each expressing the contradictory, contrary and subaltern relationships that pertain to each of the three possible future states.



Once we abandon the logically arbitrary exclusion of ‘might and might-not’ propositions from making ontological claims about possible future states and thus grant that $Z(S)$, $Z(\sim S)$, and $Q(S)$ are equally primitive, it becomes clear that an adequate schemata of all possible logical relations between propositions expressing possible future states requires three distinct versions of the Square of Opposition, each oriented around one of the three logically primitive possible future states. When coordinated with the contradictory, contrary, subcontrary and subaltern relationships that obtain between propositions expressing these three possible future states, the three squares form a Hexagon of Opposition.

Notes

1. By *exhaustively definite foreknowledge* (EDF) I refer to the traditional view that, whatever else God knows, He knows the future exhaustively as a domain of what *will* or *will not* come to pass, rather than a domain that includes what *may* and *may not* come to pass. The view that God’s knowledge of the future includes what *may* and *may not* come to pass is today commonly labelled ‘open theism’ or (my preference) ‘the open view of the future’.
2. The first motivation has been extensively covered. For works defending the open view of the future on exegetical and other grounds, see e.g. C. Pinnock *Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 2001); C. Pinnock *et al. The Openness of God* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); R. Rice *God’s Foreknowledge and Man’s Free Will* (Minneapolis MN: Bethany, 1985); J. Sanders *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998); G. Boyd *God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 2000); *idem Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Warfare Theology* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). For works defending EDF on exegetical and other grounds, see S. Roy *How Much Does God Foreknow?* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006); B. Ware *God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism* (Wheaton IL: Crossway, 2001); M. J. Erickson *God the Father Almighty: A Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1998); W. L. Craig *The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 1987); J. Frame *No Other God: A Response to Open Theism* (Phillipsburg NJ: P&R, 2001); N. Geisler & H. W. House *The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism* (Grand Rapids MI: Kregel, 2001). For a listing of more technical philosophical works on issues surrounding EDF, see n. 24.
3. This essay is in essence a report on one aspect of an ongoing research project to be published as a two-volume work entitled *The Myth of the Blueprint* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, forthcoming).
4. Bivalence is the principle that stipulates that a proposition is either true or false (Tp or Fp). It is now customary to distinguish bivalence from the closely related law of the excluded middle that stipulates that either a proposition or its contradiction is true (Tp or $\neg Tp$). Ancients did not consistently distinguish between these two principles, but as it concerns the truth value of PFC’s it seems to me they most often

- had bivalence in mind. Either it is true that ‘*x* will occur’ or it is false that ‘*x* will occur’ which, they (mistakenly, I shall argue) uniformly take to entail that, at every point prior to *t*, either *x* will or will not occur at *t*.
5. For discussions, see M. Ressor ‘Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy’, in J. M. Rist (ed.) *The Stoics* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1978), 187–202; J. M. Rist *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ch. 7; R. W. Sharples (tr. and comm.) *Cicero: On Fate (De Fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy iv.507, V (Philosophiae Consolationis)*, (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1991), 12–15.
 6. As is commonly noted, early discussions concerning fate and moral responsibility centred on the meaning of affirming that actions are ‘up to us’, not on the idea that humans possess a distinct ‘will’ that is, or is not, free. There is no consensus, however, on when exactly the concept of ‘free will’ arose. For several competing views, see S. Bobzien ‘The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free-will problem’, *Phronesis*, 43 (1998), 133–175; P. Hurby ‘The first discovery of the free will problem’, *Philosophy*, 43 (1967), 353–362; C. Kahn ‘Discovering the will: from Aristotle to Augustine’, in J. M. Dillon & A. A. Long (eds) *The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1988), 234–259; R. Sorabji ‘The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor’, in T. Pink & M. W. F. Stone (eds) *The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day* (New York NY: Routledge, 2004), 6–23; and especially A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1982).
 7. On the Epicurean view of PFCs, see Cicero *On Fate* IX.18.9; X.21; XVI.37; *idem Academics*, II.97; *idem On the Nature of the Gods*, I.25, 70. This view was espoused not only by the Epicureans but arguably by Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias (and other Peripatetics), Calcidius, Nicrostatus, and, if Proclus is to be trusted, by Porphyry (*Comm. in Timaeus* 1.352.12). See M. Mignucci ‘Ammonius on future contingent propositions’, in M. Frede & G. Striker (eds) *Rationality in Greek Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 305–306; R. Sorabji *Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 93, 124; R. W. Sharples ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato*, Some Parallels’, *Classical Quarterly*, 28 (1978), 243–266, 260–263; *idem Cicero & Boethius*, 25. In contemporary times most (but not all) theologians who deny that God possesses EDF have done so along Epicurean lines.
 8. For discussions on the atomic swerve and free will, see N. Gulley ‘Lucretius on free will’, *Symbolae Osloenses*, 65 (1990), 37–52, 46–51; J. Purinton ‘Epicurus on free volition and the atomic swerve’, *Phronesis*, 44 (1999), 293–299.
 9. On Carneades’ view, see Cicero *On Fate*, XVII–XX, XXVII. For discussions, see A. A. Long *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1986), 102–103; R. W. Sharples (tr. and comm.) *Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate* (London: Duckworth, 2003 [1983]), 11. It should be noted that Carneades and Cicero both denied the gods possess EDF, but unlike the Epicureans, Alexander of Aphrodisias and (apparently) Calcidius, this was not because they denied that bivalence applies to PFCs, but because they did not think the truth of PFCs was knowable. This view is defended by William Hasker in *God, Time and Knowledge* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
 10. The crucial passage is *On Interpretation*, IX.19a36–38. The literature discussing Aristotle’s *On Interpretation*, IX is massive. Several of the discussions I have found most helpful are R. Sorabji *Necessity, Cause and Blame*, ch. 5; W. L. Craig *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle To Suarez* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), ch. 1; V. R. McKim ‘Fatalism and the future: Aristotle’s way out’, *Review of Metaphysics*, 25 (1972), 80–111; G. Anscombe ‘Aristotle and the sea battle’, *Mind*, 64 (1956), 1–15; C. Strang ‘Aristotle and the sea battle’, *Mind*, 69 (1960), 447–465; G. Fine ‘Truth and necessity in *De Interpretatione* 9’, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 1 (1984), 23–47; J. van Eck, ‘Another interpretation of Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* IX: a support for the so-called second oldest or “Mediaeval” interpretation’, *Vivarium*, 26 (1988), 19–38. See also Mignucci ‘Ammonius’, esp. 302–303.
 11. On the dominant ancient interpretation, see Sharples *Alexander On Fate*, 11–12; *idem* ‘Some parallels’, 263–264; *idem Cicero & Boethius*, 29; R. Gaskin ‘Alexander’s sea battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Fato* 10’, *Phronesis*, 38 (1993), 75–94, 76. Sharples makes a strong case that the first to make use of the distinction between ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ truth was Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Quaestiones*, I. 4 12.13ff.), though he seems to have understood ‘indefinite’ to entail a denial of bivalence. See R. W. Sharples (tr.) *Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1–2.15* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 35, cf. 32. See also Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause and Blame*, 111–113, 124. There is much

debate about whether *Quaestiones* I.4 actually goes back to Alexander or is the writing of one of his disciples, but the point need not concern us presently.

12. *In Interpretatione*, 130.20.6, cited in Mignucci, 'Ammonius', 281. On this, see Bobzien 'Inadvertent conception', 155. For an English translation (with original Greek text) of Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* 9, see G. Seel *Ammonius and the Seabattle: Texts, Commentary and Essays* (New York NY: de Gruyter, 2000).
13. See *In Interpretatione*, 130.23–33.
14. So Mignucci 'Ammonius', 298. Dorothea Frede argues against this, however, in 'The sea-battle reconsidered: a defence of the traditional interpretation', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 3 (1983), 43–45.
15. Mignucci 'Ammonius', 302.
16. *Ibid.*, 297.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, 288–289.
19. On the issue of who originated this view, why it was developed, and how it was modified by various parties, see the excellent article by M. Mignucci 'Logic and omniscience: Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 3 (1985), 219–246. See also P. Huber *Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und Menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* (Zurich: Juris, 1976), 20–59; H. R. Patch 'Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists', *Speculum*, 10 (1935), 399; P. Courcelle *La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967), 216–221; Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause and Blame*, 124; and Sharples *Cicero & Boethius*, 26–27. On the concern for reconciling the immutable knowledge of the gods with transient reality, see e.g. Proclus *Elements of Platonic Theology*, I.15, 21, and the discussion in Mignucci 'Omniscience', 237–239.
20. See Plato *Sophist*, 248–249 and *Timaeus*, 45d. The view is also reflected in Alcinoüs *Didaskalikos*, XVIII.1, and Gellius *Noctes Atticae*, V.16.4. This understanding of vision is arguably behind Jesus' reference to the eye as 'the lamp of the body' (Matthew, 6.22; Luke, 11.34).
21. On the close association of perception and knowledge, see Aristotle *On the Soul*, 429a, and Maximus *Philosophical Orations*, VI.1 and XI.8–9.
22. See Mignucci 'Ammonius', 245; Sharples *Alexander on Fate*, 28–29.
23. Thus, evangelical critics of the open view continue to publish books with titles like (Roy) *How Much Does God Foreknow?* and (Erickson) *What Does God Know and When Does He Know it?* despite the uniform repeated insistence on the part of openness theologians that they unequivocally affirm that God *always* knows *everything*.
24. For several helpful collections of essays on these issues, see T. Morris (ed.) *The Concept of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); J. M. Fischer (ed.) *God, Foreknowledge and Freedom* (Ithaca NY & London: Cornell University Press, 1989), and especially G. Ganssle & D. Woodruff (eds) *God and Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On issues surrounding divine eternity, see P. Helm *Eternal God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); B. Leftow *Time and Eternity* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); A. Padgett *God, Eternity and the Nature of Time* (New York NY: St Martin's Press, 1992); N. Wolterstorff 'God everlasting', in C. J. Orlebeke & L. Smedes (eds) *God and the Good* (Grand Rapids MI: Eedmans, 1975); and N. Kretzmann 'Eternity', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 78 (1981), 429–458. On issues surrounding omniscience and libertarian free will, see A. Prior 'The formalities of omniscience', *Philosophy*, 37 (1962), 114–129; N. Pike 'Divine omniscience and voluntary actions', *The Philosophical Review*, 74 (1965), 27–46; E. Stump 'Prophecy, past truth and eternity', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1 (1991), 395–324; Hasker *God, Time, and Knowledge; idem* 'A philosophical perspective,' in Pinnock *et al.* *The Openness of God*, 126–154; A. Rhoda, G. Boyd, & T. Belt 'Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future', *Faith and Philosophy*, 23 (2006), 432–459; L. Zagzebski *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), and most recently, K. Rogers *Anselm on Freedom* (Oxford and New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 146–184. It should also be acknowledged that issues surrounding divine simplicity, immutability and impassibility also factor strongly into these discussions. For a sampling of helpful works on these issues, see E. Stump and N. Kretzmann 'Absolute simplicity', *Faith and Philosophy*, 2 (1985), 353–382; C. M. Hughes, *On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas' Philosophical Theology* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); T. Morris, 'Properties, modalities, and God', *The Philosophical Review*, 93 (1984), 35–55; R. Swinburne *The Coherence of Theism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); R. Creed *Divine Impassibility*

- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and N. Wolterstorff 'Suffering love', in T. Morris (ed.) *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 196–237.
25. Cicero (*On Fate*, XVI) illustrates clearly the universally shared assumption when he writes, 'it is necessary in the case of two opposed things [*contrariis duabus*] – and by 'opposed' [*contraria*] here I mean those one of which asserts something and the other denies it – it is necessary, against Epicurus' wishes, that one of these be true, the other false, as "Philoctetes will be wounded" was true for all ages beforehand, "he will not be wounded" false ...'
 26. On the Stoic use of divination to support their view of providence, see esp. Cicero *On Divination*, I.38; I.82. On the Stoic argument for determinism based on the universality of causality, see citations and discussion in Long *Hellenistic Philosophy*, 163–164; M. Dragona-Monachou 'Providence and fate in Stoicism and Prae-Neoplatonism', *Philosophia*, 3 (1973), 262–300, 262–267; Ressor 'Necessity', 200.
 27. I'm thinking here, for example, of arguments for EDF based on biblical prophecy or other data from scripture or arguments based on the perfection of God's being. On the first set of arguments, see n. 2. On the second set, see n. 24. One difficulty associated with the second set of arguments is that they often *assume* that the future is exhaustively defined by 'will' and 'will-not' type propositions. Hence arguments that a perfect being must possess EDF because of the perfection of his knowledge often end up being circular.
 28. My reflections in this section have been formed in dialogue with Alan Rhoda and Thomas Belt who share the credit for whatever merit the argument has. For a further development of this theme, see Rhoda, Boyd & Belt, 'Open theism', 432–459, and G. Boyd, A. Rhoda and T. Belt, 'The hexagon of opposition: thinking outside the Aristotelian box' (unpublished mss). The analysis of 'will,' 'will-not', and 'might and might-not' propositions being proposed here was (to the best of my knowledge) first articulated by Charles Hartshorne in 'The meaning of "is going to be"', *Mind*, 74/293 (1965), 46–58; cf. *idem*, *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), 45. It was in some respects also anticipated by Colin Strang in 'Aristotle and the sea battle', *Mind*, 69/276 (1960), 447–465.
 29. *In Interpretatione*, 131.204, cited in Mignucci 'Ammonius', 281.
 30. *In Interpretatione*, 139.15–17, cited in Mignucci 'Ammonius', 282 (emphasis added). See also *In Interpretatione*, 139.32–140.4; 140.11–13. Frede attempts to argue that Ammonius' concept of 'indefinite truth' was actually just a rather diplomatic way of denying bivalence ('Sea-battle reconsidered', 43). Given the logic of his system (as well as that of Alconius, Proclus, and Boethius), I grant that this is what Ammonius *should* have held – given the universally shared assumption that 'will' and 'will not' are contradictories rather than contraries. But passages such as *In Interpretatione*, 139.15–17 as well as the fact that Ammonius clearly ascribes EDF to the gods (136.1–7, cf. 133.20) make Frede's interpretation of Ammonius unlikely.
 31. As Hartshorne notes, 'will' and 'will-not' type propositions can only change from false to true while 'might' and 'might-not' type propositions can only change from true to false. If propositions are temporally indexed, however, there is no change in truth values; Hartshorne 'The meaning of "is going to be"', 49–50.
 32. L. H. Martin 'Fate, futurity and historical consciousness in Western antiquity', *Historical Reflections*, 17 (1991), 151–169, 164.
 33. *Ibid.*, 168. This essay does a splendid job of contrasting the typical, divination-influenced Greek view of the future as exhaustively settled with the Hebraic view that understood time to flow from a settled past toward a somewhat open future. For several helpful orienting studies on divination in the ancient Graeco-Roman world, see W. R. Halliday *Greek Divination: A Study of its Methods and Principles* (London: Macmillan, 1913); D. Collins 'Nature, cause, and agency in Greek magic', *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 133 (2003), 17–49. See also the comment of C. W. Fornara *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1983), 77. The best single source for the widespread practice of divination in the Graeco-Roman world is, of course, Cicero's *On Divination*.
 34. On the nearly universal acceptance of divination among philosophers, see Cicero *On Divination*, I.3–4, 6. On divination expressing the gods' providential concern for humans, see I.6, 15–16, 35, 38, 41, 56. For Cicero's critical assessment of this connection, see II.8, 48–50.

35. See e.g. Cicero *On Divination*, I.82–84. For other discussions, see Mignucci ‘Logic and omniscience’, 225; M. Colish *The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 31–33; S. Sambursky *Physics of the Stoics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 65–71; D. Amand *Fatalisme et Liberté dans Antiquité Grecque* (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l’Université, 1945), 571–86; J. B. Gould *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 144–145; A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), I, *Translations*, 343, and Sharples ‘Some parallels,’ 245–249. It is worth noting that Chrysippus wrote two books on divination as well as three works on fate, all of which are unfortunately lost.
36. Mignucci (‘Ammonius’, 299 [emphasis added]) illustrates the point when he writes: ‘Ammonius and the late Neoplatonic philosophers had a strong theological reason for admitting predictions. The gods are provident and they must know the world on which they exert their beneficial influence in such detail that nothing escapes their attention. *Therefore* even future contingent events must be known to them, and Ammonius does not waver in maintaining that the gods know future contingent events and that predictions are possible.’
37. Calcidius insightfully argues that, far from undermining prophecies, they are given more practical value if interpreted as *conditional predictions* that will come to pass *if* things do not change; see J. Den Boeft *Calcidius On Fate: His Doctrine and Sources* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 34–35. This sort of reasoning is found at a number of points in Alexander of Aphrodisias. See e.g. *On Fate*, e.g. VI.171.7; XVII.188.11; XXXI.202.28; and *Massima* 179.16; 182.28; 185.33; 186.8. Cicero and Carneades make much of the argument that if prophecies tell us what *will certainly* come to pass, they are useless, at best, if not positively harmful. ‘For the prediction of an evil is only beneficial when we can point out some means of avoiding it or mitigating it’; *On Divination*, II.25, cf. II.8. On the importance of accounting for divination and oracles in the ancient world (because of their widespread acceptance), see W. C. Greene *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (New York NY: Harper & Row, 1944), 375–376; Mignucci, ‘Omniscience’, 229–230, 235. This was a one of the central driving forces behind those who wanted to interpret Aristotle’s *On Interpretation*, IX in a way that avoided denying bivalence (see Mignucci ‘Ammonius’, 299–300).
38. In sharp contrast to the Hellenistic understanding of prophecy, prognostication played a minor role in Hebrew prophecy which was mostly concerned not with forecasting an inevitable future but with warning people about a *possible* future that would come to pass *if people did not change their ways*. See, e.g. Jeremiah, 18.1–10. Nor is prognostication implied in most of the Gospel passages that present Jesus as ‘fulfilling’ various Old Testament passages. Even a cursory examination of the Old Testament passages appealed to in the Gospels reveal that in most cases there is nothing predictive about them. As Paul Eddy and I have argued elsewhere, when Gospel authors claim Jesus ‘fulfilled’ an Old Testament passage, they usually (but not always) mean simply that Jesus illustrates the point or principle of the passage in a superlative way. See P. R. Eddy & G. A. Boyd *The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker, 2007), 345–346.
39. Ware *God’s Lesser Glory*, 216.
40. *Ibid.*, 20–21.
41. Space does not allow for a discussion of the different sorts of foreknowledge various thinkers ascribe to God (e.g. whether or not God knows counterfactual conditionals of creaturely freedom). Nor would such distinctions affect the thrust of my present argument.
42. Tom Morris argued along these lines when he maintained that God can possess immutable intentions that are conditioned upon possible future human free decisions, though Morris did not apply his argument to the issue of divine providence. See Morris ‘Properties, modalities, and God’, 46–49.
43. In this respect the disagreement between open theists and free-will theists who affirm EDF is similar to the long-standing debate between Arminians who espouse simple foreknowledge and Molinists who also affirm God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. For representatives of this debate, see the essays by W. L. Craig and D. Hunt in J. Bielby & P. Eddy (eds) *Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). I should also note that, for the purposes of this essay, I am overlooking issues surrounding the logical coherence of the conception of God responding to eternally settled facts in order to bring about a more desirable future (which, of course, must also have been eternally settled). On this see J. Sanders ‘Why simple foreknowledge offers no more providential control than the openness of God’, *Faith and Philosophy*, 14 (1997), 26–40, and Hasker *God, Time and Knowledge*, 55–58.
44. Ware *God’s Lesser Glory*, 216, cf. 20–21.